1.
Definition. "That principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible." (FM 27-10, para. 3.a.). "This principle limits those measures not forbidden by international law to legitimate military objectives whose engagement offers a definite military advantage." (JP 3-60, appendix E, para. E.2.b.).
a.
Elements. Military necessity includes two elements: (1) a military requirement to undertake a certain measure, (2) not forbidden by the laws of war. A commander must articulate a military requirement, select a measure to achieve it, and ensure neither violates the law of armed conflict.
b. Sources. The Lieber Code, article 14, first codified military necessity as those measures "indispensible for securing the ends of war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war." Though many treaties subsequently acknowledged military necessity's role, the principle arises predominantly from customary international law.
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The United States follows the definitions cited in FM 27-10 and JP 3-60 above.
c.
Limits. "Military necessity has been generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden by the customary and conventional laws of war . . ." (FM 27-10, para. 3.a.). Specific treaties may, however, provide an exception.
The Hostage Case at the Nuremberg Tribunal illustrates the difference. i. General rule. After the Second World War, German General Wilhelm List faced a charge of allowing his soldiers to kill thousands of civilians. He argued in part that the killings were lawful reprisals for casualties inflicted by insurgent uprisings. The Tribunal rejected the German "Kriegsraison" war doctrine that expediency and necessity supersede international law obligations. It held that "the rules of international law must be followed even if it results in the loss of a battle or even a war." (Hostage Case at 1282).
ii. Rule-based exception: General Lothar Rendulic faced a charge of ordering extensive destruction of civilian buildings and lands while retreating from an expected attack in a "scorched earth" campaign to deny use to the enemy. He grossly overestimated the danger, but argued that Hague IV authorized such destruction if "imperatively demanded by the necessities of war." 3 The Tribunal acquitted him of this charge, holding that the law's provisions "are superior to military necessities of the most urgent nature except where the Regulations themselves specifically provide the contrary." (Hostage Case at 1296).
iii. Rendulic Rule. The Rendulic case also stands for a broader proposition regarding a commander's liability for mistakes in war. The Tribunal observed that Rendulic's judgment may have been faulty, but was not criminal. " [T] he conditions, as they appeared to the defendant at the time were sufficient upon which he could honestly conclude that urgent military necessity warranted the decision made." (Hostage Case at 1297). 4 The Rendulic Rule is the standard by which commanders are judged today. Plainly stated, the rule stands for the proposition that a commander's liability is based on the information reasonably available at the time of the commander's decision.
2.
Military objective. The goal of military necessity is to identify and pursue lawful military objectives that achieve the conflict's aims and swift termination. "Only a military target is a lawful object of direct attack. By their nature, location, purpose, or use, military targets are those objects whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization offer a [definite] military advantage." (JP 3-60, para. E.4.b.). Though this definition closely resembles article 52.2 of AP I, which the United States has not yet ratified, some differences exist. 5 a. "Nature, location, purpose, or use." The ICRC Commentary to AP I, at 636-37, defines these terms as follows:
i. "Nature" includes "all objects used directly by the armed forces," such as weapons, equipment, transports, fortifications, etc.
ii. "Location" includes an object or site "which is of special importance for military operations in view of its location," such as a bridge, a deepwater port, or a piece of high ground.
iii. "Purpose" is "concerned with the intended future use of an object," such as a construction site for a suspected new military facility.
iv. "Use," on the other hand, is "concerned with [the object's] present function," such as a school being used as a military headquarters.
b. "Make an effective contribution to military action." Under AP I, an object clearly military in nature is not a military objective if it fails to meet the "effective contribution" test -for example, an abandoned, inoperable tank. Though JP 3-60, para. E.4.b. provides more latitude to target potential threats as well as "military adversary capability," resources should be directed toward highest-priority targets first. d. Dual use facilities. Some objects may serve both civilian and military purposes, for instance power plants or communications infrastructure. These may potentially be targeted, but require a careful balancing of military advantage gained versus collateral damage caused. Some experts argue that the term "dual use" is misleading in that once a civilian object is converted to military use, it loses its civilian character and is converted to a military objective. However, dual use is still referenced in U.S. doctrine.
C. Principle of Discrimination or Distinction. The principle of distinction is sometimes referred to as the "grandfather of all principles," as it forms the foundation for much of the Geneva Tradition of the law of armed conflict. The essence of the principle is that military attacks should be directed at combatants and military targets, and not civilians or civilian property. AP I, art. 48 sets out the rule: " [p] arties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives."
1.
AP I, art. 51(4), defines "indiscriminate attacks" as those attacks that:
a. Are "not directed against a specific military objective" (e.g., SCUD missiles during Desert Storm);
b. "Employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be directed at a specified military objective" (e.g., area bombing);
c. "Employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required" (e.g., use of bacteriological weapons); and ii. The phrase "unprivileged enemy belligerents" (formerly "unlawful combatants") refers to persons who engage in combat without meeting the criteria above. These may be civilians participating in hostilities or members of an armed force violating the laws of war. states that civilians enjoy protection "unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities," commonly referred to as "DPH." Those who directly participate in hostilities may be attacked in the same manner as identified members of an opposing armed force.
A. The notion of permitting direct attack on civilians, and the meaning and limits of Article 51(3)'s individual terms remains hotly contested. 11 See Melzer, ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 9, proposed rules IV, V, and IX and related discussion. authorities may designate groups or individuals as hostile. Those designated as hostile become status-based targets, subject to attack or capture at any time if operating on active battlefields or in areas where authorities consent or are unwilling or unable to capture or control them. 13 These designations and processes normally remain classified due to the sensitive nature of intelligence sources and technology, the need for operational security in military planning, and classic principles of war such as retaining the element of surprise. JAs should gather the facts and closely consult all available guidance, particularly the Rules of Engagement and theaterspecific directives or references, as well as host nation laws and sensitivities.
4.
Places. c. Natural environment. "It is generally lawful under the LOAC to cause collateral damage to the environment during an attack on a legitimate military target. However, the commander has an affirmative obligation to avoid unnecessary damage to the environment to the extent that it is practical to do so consistent with mission accomplishment . . . ."
[M]ethods and means of attack should be employed with due regard to the protection and preservation of the natural environment. Destruction . . . not required by military necessity and carried out wantonly is prohibited." JP 3-60, appendix E, para. 8.b.
i. U.S. policy establishes clear guidelines and requires a mandatory OPLAN annex to protect the environment in certain conditions during overseas operations.
14 ii. AP I, article 55 further states that the environment cannot be the object of reprisals, and that care must be taken to prevent long-term, widespread, and severe damage. The United States objects to this article as overbroad (for example, it might categorically rule out napalm or nuclear strikes), and does not consider it to be customary international law. A. Fixed or mobile medical units shall be respected and protected. They shall not be intentionally attacked.
B. Protection shall not cease, unless they are used to commit "acts harmful to the enemy."
C. There is a warning requirement before attacking a hospital that is committing "acts harmful to the enemy."
1.
Reasonable time must be given to comply with the warning before attack. ii. AP I states that a military force may attack works and installations containing dangerous forces only if they provide "significant and direct support" to military operations and the attack is the only feasible way to terminate the support. The United States objects to this provision as creating a heightened standard for attack that differs from the historical definition of a military objective.
iii. Parties may construct defensive weapons systems to protect works and installations containing dangerous forces. These weapons systems may not be attacked unless they are used for purposes other than protecting the installation. 
3.
A weapon cannot be declared unlawful merely because it may cause severe suffering or injury. The appropriate determination is whether a weapon's or munition's employment for its normal or expected use would be prohibited under some or all circumstances. The correct criterion is whether the employment of a weapon for its normal or expected use inevitably would cause injury or suffering manifestly disproportionate to the military advantage realized as a result of the weapon's use. A State is not required to foresee or anticipate all possible uses or misuses of a weapon, for almost any weapon can be used in ways that might be prohibited.
4.
In practice, DoD service TJAGs oversee legal reviews of weapons during the procurement process. JAs should read these legal reviews prior to deployment for all weapons in their unit's inventory, watch for unauthorized modifications or deliberate misuse, and coordinate with higher headquarters legal counsel if it appears that a weapon's normal use or effect appears to violate this principle. See also the discussion of the DoD Weapons Review Program below.
IV. WEAPONS
A. Two major precepts govern the regulation of weapons use in conflict. The first is the law of armed conflict principle prohibiting unnecessary suffering. The second is treaty law dealing with specific weapons or weapons systems.
B. Legal Review. Before discussing these areas, it is important to note first that all U.S. weapons and weapons systems must be reviewed by the Service TJAG for legality under the law of armed conflict.
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Reviews occur as early as possible before the award of the engineering and manufacturing development contract and again before award of the initial production contract. Legal review of new weapons is also required under AP I, art. 36.
U.S. Policy. "The acquisition and procurement of DoD weapons and weapon
systems shall be consistent with all applicable domestic law and treaties and international agreements . . . , customary international law, and the law of armed conflict . . . ." (DoD Directive 5000.01, ¶ E1.1.15). In a "TJAG review," the discussion will often focus on whether employment of the weapon or munition for its normal or expected use would inevitably cause injury or suffering manifestly disproportionate to its military effectiveness. This test cannot be conducted in isolation, but must be weighed in light of comparable, lawful weapons in use on the modern battlefield. As discussed above, weapons may be found illegal:
a. Per se. Those weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, determined by the "usage of states." Examples: lances with barbed heads, irregular shaped bullets, projectiles filled with glass (FM 27-10, ¶ 34).
b. By improper use. Using an otherwise legal weapon in a manner to cause unnecessary suffering. Example: using a flamethrower against enemy troops in trench after dousing the trench with gasoline. The intent here is to inflict unnecessary pain and injury on the enemy troops -assuming other weapons would have sufficed. Also, keep in mind that while the U.S. has not signed all the applicable treaties, many of our allies are signatories. It is important to understand what limitations our coalition partners may be facing and the impact those limitations may have on U.S. operations.
a.
The primary legal concern with landmines is that they may violate the law of armed conflict principle of discrimination. A landmine cannot tell if it is being triggered by an enemy combatant or a member of the civilian population.
b. When considering legal (not policy) restrictions on landmines, three questions must be answered:
i. What type of mine is it: anti-personnel, anti-tank, or anti-tank with anti-handling device?
ii. How is the mine delivered: remotely or non-remotely? 21 Reprinted in the Documentary Supplement. Critics have argued that this new policy is a "backdoor" accession to the Ottawa Convention. Due to the finite service life of landmines, and the cessation of new production and maintenance to extend service life, the mere passage of time will effectively strip all anti-personnel landmines from the US arsenal, even in the Korean peninsula.
iii. Does it ever become inactive or self-destruct? Is it "smart" or "dumb?" ("Smart" mines are those that are self-destructing, selfneutralizing, or self-deactivating. "Dumb" landmines are persistent, and a threat until they are triggered or lifted. NOTE: Any APLs in the current US inventory, now exclusively for use in Korea, are all "smart" -designed to deactivate if not triggered for a certain period of time. This time period is selectable, from a few days to a few weeks. Persistent mines exist on the Korean peninsula, but are owned and emplaced by North and South Korea.
c. The primary treaty that restricts U.S. use of mines is Amended Protocol II to the CCW.
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The U.S. ratified the Amended Protocol on May 24, 1999. Amended Protocol II:
i.
Expands the scope of the original Protocol to include internal armed conflicts;
ii. Requires that all remotely delivered anti-personnel landmines be "smart" -or equipped with an effective mechanism for selfdestruction after the passage of a certain period of time ;
iii. Requires that all "dumb" (do not automatically deactivate) anti personnel landmines be used within controlled, marked, and monitored minefields; accordingly, they may not be remotely delivered;
iv. Requires that all anti-personnel landmines be detectable using available technology (i.e., that they contain a certain amount of iron so as to be detectable using normal mine sweeping equipment);
v.
Requires that the party laying mines assume responsibility to ensure against their irresponsible or indiscriminate use; and vi. Provides for means to enforce compliance.
vii. Clarifies the use of the M-18 Claymore "mine" when used in the tripwire mode (art. 5(6)). (Note: When used in command-detonated mode, the Protocol does not apply, as the issue of distinction is addressed by the "triggerman" monitoring the area). Claymores may be used in the tripwire mode, without invoking the "dumb" This treaty is commonly referred to as the Ottawa Treaty and entered into force on March 1, 1999. As of this writing, 161 States have ratified the Convention including Canada and the United Kingdom. The U.S. was active in negotiations, but withdrew in September of 1997 when other countries would not allow exceptions for the use of anti-personnel landmines in Korea and other uses of "smart" anti-personnel landmines. The Ottawa Treaty bans ALL anti-personnel landmines, whether they are "smart" or "dumb." Nations who have signed this treaty can only maintain a small supply for training purposes. Note: Ottawa only bans anti-personnel landmines; therefore, Ottawa does not restrict our allies in regards to anti tank or anti-tank with anti-handling device mines. In addition, Ottawa does not ban Claymore mines as they have a human operator. ii. Tracers, white phosphorous, and other illuminants, as well as explosive munitions that combine incendiary and other effects such as "thermobaric"/fuel-air munitions, are not considered incendiaries. (Art 1(1) ). However, JAs should ensure they are properly used, particularly if near concentrations of civilians.
4.
Cluster Bombs or Combined Effects Munitions (CM). These are highly effective against a variety of targets, such as air defense radars, armor, artillery, and large enemy personnel concentrations. Since the bomblets or submunitions 25 Reprinted in the Documentary Supplement.
dispense over a relatively large area and a small percentage typically fail to detonate, this may create an unexploded ordinance (UXO) hazard. CMs are not mines, are acceptable under the laws of armed conflict, and are not timed to go off as anti-personnel devices. However, disturbing or disassembling submunitions may cause them to explode and result in civilian casualties. allies, but most nations that manufacture or use CMs (US, Russia, China, India, Israel) still reject it. The United States is not a party as it continues to use CMs for certain targets as described above, but lobbied to preserve interoperability for non-signatory states to use and stockpile CM even during multinational operations.
b. In 2008, the Secretary of Defense signed a DoD Cluster Munitions
Policy mandating by 2018 a reduction of obsolete CM stocks, improvement of CM UXO standards to 1%, and replacement of existing stocks.
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From 2008-2011, the United States also sponsored an unsuccessful effort to add a new CCW Protocol regulating-but not banning-cluster munitions. 28 Current U.S. practice is to mark coordinates and munitions expended for all uses of cluster munitions, and to engage in early and aggressive EOD clearing efforts as soon as practicable. i. Prohibits the use of lethal, incapacitating, and biological agents. The protocol prohibits the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices. . . ."
ii. The U.S. considers the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol as applying to both lethal and incapacitating chemical agents.
A. Incapacitating agents are those chemical agents producing symptoms that persist for hours or even days after exposure to the agent has terminated. The U.S. views Riot Control Agents (RCA) as having a "transient" effect, and NOT incapacitating agents. Therefore, the U.S. position is that the treaty does not prohibit the use of RCA in war, and it published an Understanding to this effect upon ratifying the treaty. (Other nations disagree with this interpretation). See further discussion below on RCA.
iii. Under the Geneva Gas Protocol, the U. iii. Article III requires parties to declare stocks of chemical weapons and facilities they possess.
iv. Articles IV and V include procedures for destruction and verification, including routine on-site inspections.
v. Article VIII establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPWC).
vi. Article IX establishes "challenge inspection;" a short notice inspection in response to another party's allegation of non compliance.
7.
Riot Control Agents (RCA). The use of RCA by U.S. troops is governed by four key documents. In order to determine which documents apply to the situation at hand, you must first answer one fundamental question: is the U.S. currently engaged in war? If so, use of RCA is governed by the CWC and Executive Order 11850. If not, then use of RCA is governed by CJCSI 3110.07C, and, more tangentially, by the Senate's resolution of advice and consent to the CWC.
a. War. For the specific purposes of determining legality of RCA use, "war" is defined as an international armed conflict to which the United States is a party.
i. CWC. As noted above, the CWC prohibits use of RCA as a "method of warfare." The President decides if a requested use of RCA qualifies as a "method of warfare." As a general rule, during war, the more it looks like the RCA is being used on enemy combatants, the more likely it will be considered a "method of warfare" and prohibited.
ii Article 37 also refers only to confidence in international law (LOW), not moral, obligations. The latter was viewed as too abstract by certain delegations. 41 The U.S. view includes breaches of moral and legal obligation as being violations, citing the broadcast of a false announcement to the enemy that an armistice had been agreed upon as being treacherous. (FM 27-10, para. 50) ii. It is not perfidy (a violation of AP I, art 37) to (mis)use the emblem of the UN to try to gain protected status if the UN has member forces in the conflict as combatants (even just as peacekeepers). As in the case of the misuse of the flag of truce, misuse of a UN emblem that does not result in a killing, capture, or surrender, is nonetheless a violation of AP I, art. 38, because that article prohibits the use of the UN emblem without authorization.
h. Misuse of Red Cross, Red Crescent, or cultural property symbol.
i. Designed to reinforce/reaffirm HR, art. 23(f).
ii. GC I requires that wounded and sick, hospitals, medical vehicles, and, in some cases, medical aircraft be respected and protected. The protection is lost if forces are committing acts harmful to the enemy. civilian population, civilian property, cultural property, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population (food, livestock, drinking water), the natural environment, and installations containing dangerous forces (dams, dikes, nuclear power plants) (AP I, arts. 51 and 53 -56). The U.S. specifically objects to these restrictions as not reflective of customary international law.
3. U.S. policy is that a reprisal may be ordered only at the highest levels (U.S. President).
